Posts Tagged ‘Arts’

Subsidized Art vs. The Middle Class

Wednesday, March 24th, 2010
Il pleut
Image by Julie70 via Flickr

I can’t make up stuff like this. From the Telegraph, “Children’s art club closed as ‘too middle class’ “,

The Paint Pots Arts Club, in Hackney, London, will have its funding withdrawn at the end of the month as council officials said their monitoring had found that it was not reaching families with the most difficult needs.

The club is funded by one of the Government’s flagship Sure Start centres which are aimed at supporting new parents and offer health services, childcare and early learning and employment advice.

Mrs Ritches [the director of Paint Pots Arts Club] said: “Middle class mothers struggle with work, sleep deprivation, and post natal depression just like any other mother. But the Learning Trust officials concluded that 68 per cent of all users were white. I told them just because they are white does not mean they are middle-class. But they said you could work out their properties’ value from their postcodes.”

A letter to Mrs Ritches from officials said: “Based on our monitoring information, the Arts Club is not reaching the families who have the most difficult needs. Accordingly I have to advise you that the contract for the Arts Club will end on March 31st.”

The article goes on to explain that instead of helping the needy via art programs, more direct assistance is going to be used. I am of the opinion that if subsidy is ever to be used, cash subsidy is usually the best idea if the goal is to help individuals maintain their livelihood in a way they see fit, since it allows recipients to put the cash to its most urgent need, which may or may not be art classes for their children. It seems the idea to start the art club in the first place was misguided. But I don’t think governments are in the habit of doing feasibility tests to assess market demand for a target demographic prior to the inception of their programs. I think they like the “build it and see what happens” approach, which often ends in waste and disappointment.

Perhaps a feasibility test would have shown lower income families cannot even allocate the time or resources to sending their children to free art classes, since it could be perceived as setting an expectation of continued education (resources used) at home or in the future when there is no guarantee funding for such programs will be maintained – as evidenced by this bizarre charade with The Paint Pots Arts Club.

Reblog this post [with Zemanta]

Applaud if You Want To – It’s Only Natural

Sunday, March 14th, 2010
Crowd applause taken at the Liverpool Arabic A...
Image via Wikipedia

If you love music, but are never sure when is the “right time” to clap during concerts, or happen to be one of those snobs who ridicules people who clap at the “wrong time”, Alex Ross of The Rest is Noise fame has some thoughts for you and challenges to the so-called No-Applause Rule.

While I usually feel kind of bad for people who clap at the “wrong time” I always understand why they do: the music asked them to. I only give the maloika to people who incessantly wrestle with their cough drop wrappers during performances. HINT: if you must, unwrap them prior to your event and place them into a sandwich baggie, which can be virtually soundless due to the miracles of soft plastic.

Ross argues that by smothering audience enthusiasm with the No-Applause Rule, we may be putting the fear of God into already reluctant concert-goers and making the entire experience less fun and more intimidating. Furthermore, by imposing rules on when applause is acceptable, we may doing a disservice to the spirit of much of the music written that sonically begs for applause at the “wrong” times. Okay – he explains it a lot better.

The lecture at The Royal Philharmonic Society opens with,

Last fall, Barack Obama hosted an evening of classical music at the White House—once an unremarkable event, more recently something of a freak occurrence. Beforehand, he said, “Now, if any of you in the audience are newcomers to classical music, and aren’t sure when to applaud, don’t be nervous. Apparently, President Kennedy had the same problem. He and Jackie held several classical-music events here, and more than once he started applauding when he wasn’t supposed to. So the social secretary worked out a system where she’d signal him through a crack in the door to the cross-hall. Now, fortunately, I have Michelle to tell me when to applaud. The rest of you are on your own.”

Obama was having some fun at the expense of the No-Applause Rule, a central tenet of modern classical-music etiquette, which holds that one must refrain from clapping until all movements of a work have sounded. No aspect of the prevailing classical concert ritual seems to cause more puzzlement than this regulation. The problem isn’t that the No-Applause Rule is so terribly arcane that even a law professor turned commander-in-chief cannot master it.

Rather, it’s that the etiquette and the music sometimes work at cross purposes. When the average person hears this—

[EXAMPLE: End of third movement of Pathétique]

—his or her immediate instinct is to applaud. The music itself seems to demand it, even beg for it. The word “applause” comes from the instruction “Plaudite,” which appears at the end of Roman comedies, instructing the audience to clap.

Chords such as these are the musical equivalent of “Plaudite.” They almost mimic the action of putting one’s hands together, the orchestra being unified in a series of quick, percussive sounds.

So if President Kennedy—or President Obama, for that matter—ever clapped after the third movement of Tchaikovsky’s Pathétique, or the first movement of the “Emperor” Concerto, or in other “wrong” places, he was intuitively following instructions contained in the score. This explains why newcomers exhibit such anxiety on the subject; it even appears that fear of incorrect applause can inhibit people from attending concerts, although they may be merely inventing excuses. Children pose a particular problem. If you examine literature handed out by various music-education associations, you notice that the suppression of enthusiasm in children is a major concern. Program booklets sometimes contain a little list of rules rendered in the style of God on Mount Sinai: “Thou shalt not applaud between movements of symphonies or other multisectional works listed on the program.” And it is often insisted that one may only applaud: “Appropriate applause is the only acceptable audible response from the audience.” One must make no other noise—for example, with one’s mouth.


Reblog this post [with Zemanta]

Arts Labor Markets: An Informal Case Study

Thursday, March 4th, 2010

I did not think my last post would generate such lively discussion – so I propose we refocus and delve deeper into one particular economic aspect of the conversation that I think is critical. While this informal case study I offer is by no means exhaustive, I hope it will be informative to readers interested in arts labor market economics. Having said that, it is rather long for a blog post, so I hope you will all bear with me or bookmark for later.

In discussing whether the proposed legislation of setting a maximum duration/minimum wage for arts internships makes economic sense (in that it achieves its intended effects), we should first review the effects of setting price floors and determine if, indeed, there is an economic benefit to imposing a maximum duration/minimum wage for internships.

According to the economic laws of supply and demand, setting a price floor for wages above the equilibrium wage, ceteris paribus, will do two things:

  1. Increase the demand from workers for the wage.
  2. Decrease the supply of the jobs offering the wage. (Hubbard and O’Brien, 2006)

Looking at each of these points individually, we can see that imposing legislation requiring arts organizations to pay interns a minimum wage after a certain period of time would likely result in more interns wanting those higher-paid jobs (point 1), as well as a decreased ability for organizations to offer the jobs due to the impact on their budgets (point 2). As a result, the increase of interns supplied will cause net higher unemployment in the arts, not less. However, it does not seem this is a point of concern for those in favor of the legislation so we will not address it here. Instead, I suggest we focus on the net effect on the poor, since that is what seems to be a main point of contention.

Now, it is likely that point 1 will not be considered significant or negative by those supporting the legislation – as they may consider an increase in potential interns a benefit (perhaps due to the externality of arts appreciation, etc). However, a closer look at the effect can be seen as detrimental in particular to the poor (who the legislation is ostensibly attempting to help obtain gainful employment), due to the fact that flooding the market with additional supply of workers will result in even stiffer competition, with those winning the even better paid positions being those who already have more experience (who we seem to agree are more likely to be those already better off or able to afford the unpaid internships).

As we’ve already agreed thus far, poorer interns are unlikely to have such experience, and as a result they are even less likely to win the paid internships than when they were unpaid. This is because an organization offering work for free is likely to be more discriminating about their intern choice once the same position is  offered for pay and can have a positive or negative effect (however small) on their bottom line. Furthermore, we are not talking about hiring relatively unskilled labor where the difference in prior experience is largely irrelevant, such as janitorial services or working in a fast food restaurant.  We are talking about serving the needs of arts organizations, which would seek to hire interns with basic proficiency in computer skills, verbal and written communication, and some prior education in the arts for a paid position.

As already noted in the comments, volunteers are more likely to fill unskilled positions like ushering, stuffing envelopes, or posting signage for events, for example. There is no reason to believe organizations offering new paid positions are going to seek less qualified interns to fill them. So, the effect of the legislation will be to price poorer/inexperienced potential interns out of the market altogether, effectively eliminating the bottom rung of the ladder as it were, leaving them with less opportunity to advance their arts careers, not more. Therefore, the effects of the legislation will actually harm those it is purporting to help and simply help more experienced interns get better jobs – which is not in and of itself negative on an absolute basis – but it is certainly not achieving the intended effects of the legislation.

Point 2 is likely to be explained away as it was in an earlier comment as to have a negligible change on the finances of a larger arts organization. This may be true, but it may also not be true – we cannot know without additional information and review of the finances of arts organizations, which are often far more sensitive to changes in allocation of capital due to the volatile nature of their business, so it would stand to reason that imposing additional financial burdens (however small) would affect them on a more than negligible basis*. Furthermore, the point is not only to address the finances of larger arts organizations as they are not the only ones affected by the legislation, but all arts organizations that offer internships, which no doubt span small to large in size of operations.

However, even if we accept a high likelihood of larger organizations being able to afford paid interns (and even if we neglect to perform financial feasibility studies to determine the marginal revenue product of labor – which is clearly more important when paying employees than when letting them work for free), the replacement rate of paid jobs for the previously unpaid jobs is unlikely to be 100%, otherwise there would be no need for legislation and interns would already be paid (that is, if we accept the premise an equilibrium wage rate can and should be found). So, otherwise, under force of legislation would the paid job replacement rate be 90%, 50%, or 10%? Again, we cannot know without additional information.

But even if we accept a generous 90% rate of ability to pay interns providing the same amount and duration of internships (i.e. opportunity) by larger organizations after legislation is imposed, we can then anticipate that rate will decrease in some proportion (more or less) in relation to the decrease in size of an organization’s operations and their particular financial situation. We can probably also agree smaller organization’s finances are likely to be even more volatile than large ones, have less expendable income, and rely more heavily on both volunteers and unpaid interns. As a result, this legislation is likely to more than proportionately negatively affect the operations of smaller arts organizations because it is well-known that small arts organizations struggle more than their larger counterparts to win both private and public dollars.  The likely result of forcing them to pay their interns will be less ability to offer positions than their larger counterparts and may require downsizing their operations and offerings, again due to their heavier reliance on volunteers and interns.

It can be seen that the result of the legislation in economic terms is a net loss of opportunity offered by all arts organizations and made available to all arts interns, affecting smaller organizations and poorer interns more than larger organizations and well-off interns**. While economics cannot determine with finality which decisions should be made, it allows the conversation to then inform the philosophical arguments of whether or not more or less opportunity in the arts is beneficial and whether offering more or less opportunity to the poor is good or bad. Clearly those in support of the legislation are not concerned with the net loss of opportunity and are misguided in thinking the poor would be the primary beneficiaries of what positive results (possibly more paid positions) are obtained.

Another correct point mentioned above is that this type of legislation is administratively and logistically laborious to police and punish, if not near impossible. This is another point against it, since the addition of government employees needed to monitor the exploitative behavior will probably not be made due to low priority (since the type of so-called exploitation is hardly as serious as other criminal activity that is far more prevalent and detrimental than the supposed horrors of lengthy unpaid internships in the arts) or monitoring will be unsuccessful due to the ease of participants finding loopholes.

So in reality, this may be glamour legislation that can do little to stop the unwanted and promote the intended behaviors, but may win legislators some votes come election time because it sounds like a nice thing to do according to those who have imperfect information regarding economics. I can only hope what is more likely is that its net effect on actual finances/interns in practice is very small. I imagine there are/will be more “volunteer” opportunities in the arts than “internships” and that hopefully they look just as good on these poor struggling student’s resumes.

* A highly-contested study, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania (Card and Krueger, 1995) on price floors in labor markets have offered some evidence that the net effect of price floors in the fast food industry has negligible effects in terms of decreasing the supply of labor (and by extension wages set at a minimum) and output of businesses in that industry. However, these studies are not the final word on price floors, and even if they were, they cannot provide us significant insight into the arts industry’s labor market – which is vastly different than the fast food industry whose price elasticity of demand (for labor) is relatively inelastic (meaning when the price/cost of labor increases, there will be little impact on amount supplied to workers), whereas the price elasticity of demand in arts markets is arguably more elastic (meaning when the price/cost of labor increases, there would be more impact). This analysis is only theoretical at this point, and would require further study to determine with finality.

** Which proves my original quick analysis of the legislation was faulty! Since the title of the original post was “Let’s Level the Playing Field by Making Everyone Worse Off” and I have determined that not everyone would be worse off, only the poor would be worse off, I think this has been a valuable exercise.

Reblog this post [with Zemanta]

Fanning the Semantic Flame

Tuesday, January 5th, 2010

I recently found myself caught in a bit of a hot spot while commenting on the arts administration blog, Adaptistration. One commenter, Lisa Hirsh of Iron Tongue of Midnight commented,

Boy, I hate where the outgoing president uses the phrase “passion for the product.” “Product” – such a commodified and anonymous way to talk about an orchestra.

I countered with,

I cannot see what is inherently negative in reframing artistic output as a product – this does not devalue art.

Just as a musician practicing his scales is not necessarily making creatively-inspired music; he is no less a musician.

Art that is objectively scrutinized for quality and profitability is still art, not less than art.

Admittedly my analogy was poor (that will teach me not to hastily comment on blog posts!), but it was my last comment which seemed to draw criticism that it did not make much sense, in that it did not relate to the definition of “product.” I can see why that was the case, and admittedly, I was adding meaning to Lisa’s comment that was not explicitly there by inferring that she (or others who dislike using the word product) believed calling orchestral output a “product” was tantamount to “devaluing it” or that necessarily following calling it a product is the action of “objectively scrutiniz[ing orchestral output] for quality and profitability” which is loathsome (particularly profitability).

Phew – looks like I have some baggage, eh? But seriously, I have this baggage only because I have encountered so much of it in the arts world. So, if indeed this is what was meant by Lisa’s comment, I stand by mine. Otherwise, for clarity I still think the answer to Drew McManus’ original inquiry in the post of, “whether or not term ‘product’ is appropriate to use in the context of describing live, performing art” is yes.

To state the obvious, there is no logical reason anyone should fear, be irritated by, or have any other negative connection to calling something a product. It is like calling the sky blue or a dog furry. A product is not inherently a negative thing, but a neutral thing, so to have a negative reaction is truly nonsensical.

Having said all that, I think something far more interesting, semantically, within the post is the use of the words commodification (Lisa’s use) versus commoditization (Drew’s use). I did not think they were interchangeable, and was interested to find out, according to one artist, author, teacher and documentarian Douglas Rushkoff, in his post on the topic, why not.

From Commodified vs. Commoditized,

Strangely enough, this little usage dilemma hasn’t been written about in any reference book or website I can find. And my copyeditors at HarperCollins want me to use the word “commodified” exclusively, since it’s the only one in Websters. But I see the words as very different, and have issued a big STET on that one. And so I am hereby declaring the proper way for these two words to be used, based on the way I’ve been hearing them, as well as seeing them used in magazines and books:

“Commodification” is a somewhat Marxist idea, referring to the way that market values can replace other social values, or the way a market can replace a communal system. “Our parties become commodified as Tupperware moves in to turn them into buying opportunities.” or “The techniques for proper breast feeding used to be passed down from mother to daughter, but now there is a market for lactation consultants. As a result, one of the most intimate human functions has become commodified.”

“Commoditization” is a newer and undocumented word (except in WIKI) referring specifically to the way that goods that used to be distinguishable in terms of attributes end up becoming mere commodities in the eyes of the market or consumers. “The collapse of Marlboro’s brand value in the early 1990’s convinced cigarette manufacturers that their products had become commoditized.” or “Unless Intel comes up with a new kind of computer memory chip, Japanese equivalents will commoditize RAM.” The problem with commoditization is that the only thing that left to distinguish one brand from another is price, so margins shrink.

Commodification is more of a crime of the market against humanity, while commoditization is more of a market problem for the manufacturers of branded goods.

So, if we apply Lisa’s defintion of “Product – such a commodified…way to talk about an orchestra.” Can we then infer the negative connotation of “product” stems from the idea that to commodify something is to commit a heinous act (according to Marx, et al) of replacing social values (art, beauty, the ineffable) with market values (money, marketability, the profitable)?

Drew’s usage of the term commoditization and its connection to “product” makes a bit more sense to me, as he is expressing concern over the usage of the word “product” in association with the phenomenon of “commoditization” as it relates to necessarily devaluing the orchestra’s output, such that replacing players would result in zero qualitative difference. As he states, this is clearly not the case.

My conclusion? Go forth and use the word “product” to describe the output of any performing art with the knowledge it means nothing other than output, creation, good for sale, etc. From there, you are free to make any qualitative judgments about said product, but nothing qualitative can be inferred from the usage of the word “product.”

Reblog this post [with Zemanta]
 
© Powerered by Wordpress | Custom Template Design by NBurman Design